Because Austin maintains that the illocutionary is conventional and the perlocutionary is not (121), Cavell argues that illocutions come down on the side of the Law, while perlocutions give voice to Desire. Where the illocutionary is scripted and prescribed, the perlocutionary opens up space for improvisations. According to Mulhall, 3 
"false" only stand "for a general dimension of being a right or proper thing to say…in these circumstances, to this audience, for these purposes and with these intentions" (145; emphasis added)?
The quickest way into my argument is to look at the claims that Alice Crary has spelled out in her articles "Happy Truth" and "Austin and the Ethics of Discourse" as well as in her book Beyond Moral Judgment. Crary's discussions of Austin are really 5 local skirmishes in a much broader assault on the tradition of modern moral theory.
She maintains that philosophers' habit of banning personal sensibility from rationality and the concomitant restriction of moral reasoning to agreements or disagreements about judgments impoverishes our understanding of the reach of moral thought. Crary looks to Austin to show that the abstractions considered necessary to ascertain the literal sentence-meaning of an utterance are of a piece with the prejudicial demand that we leave our individual sensitivities at the door when we come to use moral concepts. She argues that we give up too much when we reduce our assessments of utterances to consideration of literal sentence-meaning, just as we give up too much when we imagine that moral thought has to be shorn of affect. In the end, we can return utterances to their native habitat in lived experience without giving up philosophy's demand for objectivity and rationality.
I will not follow Crary quite that far. By offering an account of the place of convention and the perlocutionary in How To Do Things With Words, I hope to induce his most radical-and it is Crary's point that commentators have avoided the full implications of his argument-Austin indicates that we don't begin with "meanings" at all. We don't start off with an utterance's detachable "sense and reference" which we then recast as questions or assertions or demands. Rather, force and effect are as integral to the total speech act as its sense and reference. Thus to reduce an utterance to its locutionary "meaning" gives us an inaccurate and impoverished notion of how it is that utterances mean. As I have already had occasion to mention, in the second-tolast lecture of How To Do Things With Words, Austin shows that we can only properly speak of meaning in the same way that we talk of truth, that is, in light of all the dimensions of an utterance's occurrence. We have to consider its sense and reference, its force, its context and its intended (and actual) effects. 6 Austin's rejection of the idea that a statement's meaning is independent of that statement's linguistic conventions and effects does not mean that he foregoes the possibility of objective truth. According to Crary, the idea that objective truth will go by the board as soon as we do away with literal sentence-meaning (a notion that Derrida and Searle seem to share) is based on a sneaking metaphysical assumption that Austin's conclusions do not allow. According to Crary, it is a fundamental feature of Austin's position that there is no such thing as a "non-conventional alternative to our current conception of the world" (emphasis added). There is thus "no such thing as a comparison between our current conception and such an alternative." If we are rigorous in our refusal of literal sentence-meanings, we have to forego "the sort of metaphysical vantage point from which to discern that our efforts thus to separate ourselves [from literal sentence-meanings] cut us off from objective truth." In other 7 words, to get rid of literal sentence-meaning is also to get rid of the idea that we could stand somewhere outside of language or convention.
Crary thus reminds of two important points. The first is that How To Do Things With Words is constructed as a pedagogical text, an exemplary demonstration of how to think a problem through. At one moment, Austin imagines that his audience is impatient and wants him "to cut the cackle" and cut to the chase (123).
But it takes him a long time to do that. The categorical distinction between the performative and the constative, which looked so promising at the start, has to founder midway so that can see that we are not talking about separate kinds of sentences, but rather about features that are common to all sentences. It takes Austin a number of pages to show that the formulae that might distinguish the illocutionary from the perlocutionary are not conclusive. In other words, Austin works them through in order to work them-and his audience-over, or, to use one of his own jokes, he is flogging us until we are converted. This means some of his moves are tactical feints.
" . For a dissenting view, see Hansen's sympathetic critique of Crary's reading of Austin. I sus 6 -pect that Hansen accepts too readily some of Austin's tactical feints. Nat Hansen, "J. L. Austin and Literal Meaning," European Journal of Philosophy 22.4 (2013) , 617-632.
" . Crary, "Austin and the Ethics of Discourse," 53. 7
Crary also reminds us of the centrality of convention to Austin's argument. As the illocutionary is eo ipso conventional-a point that Austin makes on several occa- being speech, based on language. Incorrect, because some illocutionary acts do not actually require words at all. You can make gestures of entreaty or deny an allegation with a mere shake of your head. So illocutionary acts are not necessarily linguistic.
You cannot say the same of locutionary acts. You cannot perform a locutionary act without language. If any dimension of the speech act situation is solely and thus "conventionally" linguistic (in this broad sense), it is the locutionary.
Strawson suggests that what is at stake in Austin's insistence on the conventionality of illocutions is not conventionality in itself, but intention. A speaker's intention in a ceremonial speech act is not ambiguous. What Austin calls uptake-"bringing about the understanding of the meaning and the force of the locution" (117) This account finds the warrant for the explicit performative in the relative under-determination of many illocutionary acts. Unless I make it plain, you might not realize that my warning is a warning, rather than a terse description of a bull or a sniper or an impending storm. Strawson and Warnock maintain that unless I do make it plain, you might not know which illocutionary act I intend. Their explanation makes sense, but it begs the issue of why Austin might want to call an estimate, a recommendation or assurance conventional. Strawson and Warnock show that the explicit performative behaves like a convention, not that it is a convention. While the explicit performative might serve the same function as a ritual formula, that does not make it one.
I would like to take a crack at this problem by splitting the difference between Austin's initial strong identification of convention with ritual and the trivial definition of illocutionary convention as a mere "making use of language." Austin suggests that illocutions produce a certain range of consequences. These are different from the consequences that attend the perlocutionary, because they are narrower. Perlocutionary effects sometimes-even often-depend on the idiosyncrasies of the people who are addressed. In spite of my best efforts, you might refuse to be intimidated, fail to be convinced, or remain unwilling to be moved by what I say. Illocutions, on the other hand, "invite by convention a response or a sequel" (117; emphasis added). The range of this response and sequel is delimited by the illocutionary verb itself. If you ask me a question, the question by its very nature invites me to answer. (My silence might in itself be an answer.) If you order me to do something, the command by its very nature invites me to obey, just as your request invites me accede. Austin says that "the response or sequel might be 'one-way' or 'two-way '" (117) because there is a difference between committing myself by making a promise (or claiming that I know something) and asking you to wipe your feet. The rules that govern these acts and their sequels might be governed by social rituals or by the informal sanctions we call manners, but they all form part of our ability to speak the language. If I know how to offer you a drink, I know that you can decline the offer. Part of the point of uptake, then, is recognizing not just what act is being performed, but also understanding what sequel or response is being solicited. Illocutions are vulnerable to misfire precisely because their force and thus their sequels can so easily be mistaken.
While in some cases my ability to tell the difference between a demand, a request and an entreaty might require both tact and insight, the ability to tell this difference ultimately lies not with my psychological acumen or my good manners, but with my basic linguistic competence. The important distinctions between these acts are inscribed in, or prescribed by, our language. They are intrinsic to our description of the acts we perform and our understanding of the sequels that those acts invite. Illocutionary conventions, then, lie below the level of ritual and etiquette (although it might be rude not to answer a question). They rest on the distinctions that we enact when we perform, describe or respond to illocutionary acts. If I misunderstand your request as a demand-if there is a catch in the uptake-my response will not be the conventional one. The result could turn out well or badly, as either comedy or tragedy, depending.
The linguistic rules and expectations at play in illocutionary acts make their sequels and responses more predictable than is possible with perlocutionary acts. This is because illocutions are conventional in ways that a perlocution cannot be. Because I cannot say "I persuade you," I cannot put you in a position where the possible range of sequels to my attempt is set. I can come close to an explicit perlocutionary act by admitting that I am trying to persuade you, but such a statement of intent is usually taken to be a sign of failure. As it is, the perlocutionary always requires other means to achieve its ends-it makes use of locutionary-illocutionary acts-and it cannot speak its name except in retrospect or in disappointment. These are indications of its constitutional vulnerability.
In the end, perlocutionary effect depends on a wide array of context-specific variables, and can never simply rely on our linguistic competence the way the illocutionary can. This is why Cavell sees it as a form of improvisation. The perlocutionary is often the scene of surprise or disappointment. I can accept your argument, but I might find it trivial-you have not impressed me. (If you meant to impress me, you have failed.) I might not agree with your assertion that "all flesh is grass," but I might take heart from your having said it. (You have succeeded in consoling me, but not as you had planned.) When you warn me that jumping from the second story into the snow is dangerous, I, being foolhardy, might find myself moved to fling myself from the window for fun. (You have persuaded me to do it, in spite of your intention. This can either be counted as a failure or as an ironic success.) In short, with the perlocutionary, there is no telling how things will go. So, we can say that speech acts are conventional to the extent that they derive their locutionary sense and their illocutionary force from the established conventions of our language. Their sense comes from our shared definitions and their force from the set range of responses and sequels that illocutionary verbs invite. But there is no reason to take this pervasive conventionality as a call for skepticism. Post-Saussurean appropriations of Austin go against the grain because Austin was trained as a philologist and had an essentially historical view of language. He did not assume that words get their meaning from their place in an arbitrary differential system nor did he see that convention was conclusively arbitrary. Austin refuses to be drawn into a latter-day Idealism much in the same way that he refuses the pragmatist doctrine "that the true is what works, &c. " (145) . This is because he sees a cognitive value in linguistic convention and it is this belief that underwrites his commitment to ordinary language.
At base, Austin's "linguistic phenomenology" consists of using "a sharpened awareness of our words to sharpen our perception… of the phenomena." Even 12 " . J.L. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses," Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 12 1979), 181. All further references to this essay will be included parenthetically in the text. ment in both language and knowledge, not the zero degree from which all language or knowledge begin.
It follows, then, that for Austin the conventions of natural language serve as valuable cognitive tools because they provide relatively up-to-date and readily serviceable distinctions and connections. He assumes that a good deal of solid knowledge inheres in our linguistic conventions, provided that we have the wit and the training to use those conventions with discretion. They are, in the jargon of another tradition, world-disclosive.
Convention is thus central to Austin's account of speech acts and to his linguistic phenomenology. The illocutionary is conventional to the extent that illocutionary verbs entail set or predictable responses and sequels. Their intention can be made explicit and that very explicitness (in a felicitous utterance at least) then prescribes or limits the kinds of sequel or response that can follow. As we have seen, the same is not true of the perlocutionary. The relative absence of conventions that could insure perlocutionary effect makes that dimension of the speech act harder to schematize.
That is not to say that perlocutionary acts are completely unconventional. They are propped, after all, on the conventionality of the both the locutionary and the illocutionary. Nor is it to say that we cannot predict the perlocutionary effects of our utterances. We can reasonably expect a certain range of reactions to our utterances, though we might not always achieve our intended-or rather, our desired-goal.
As Cavell argues, if we could shore up the perlocutionary consequences of our utterances by making our intentions explicit, our speech would quickly shade over into magic. To persuade you by merely uttering the formula "I persuade you" would be tantamount to casting a spell. (Part of the anthropological thrust of Austin's speech-act 13 theory is to make speech a form of action without turning it into efficacious magic.) But if we were unable to predict any perlocutionary effects at all, then our conversation would shade over into solipsism or madness. Cavell puts it nicely: if the performative and the illocutionary bring the "I" primarily into the picture, the perlocutionary cedes that place to the "you." That "you" might be skittish, but its responses are not comple 14 -" . "If apparently perlocutionary acts (uttering "I deter, punish, alarm, amaze, disgust, seduce, 13 delight, etc. you") were eo ipso (as Austin likes to say) to deter, punish, alarm, disgust, seduce, delight you, speech would essentially, over an unsurveyable field, be a form of magic…" Cavell, "Forward," xix.
" . Cavell, "Forward," xx; "Performative and Passionate Utterances," 179. 14 tely unforeseen. After all, we have developed canons of persuasion to help speakers reach their desired perlocutionary ends. If the achievement of perlocutionary effects were entirely a matter of luck, there would be no study of rhetoric at all.
The speech act necessarily summons forth both that "I" and that "you;" a speech situation will encompass both poles. All this is merely to say that the perlocutionary and the illocutionary are not really opposing speech acts, but distinct and complementary dimensions of a single complex action that Austin calls the utterance.
They only seem to be separate acts because in our descriptions of the speech situation we choose to emphasize one aspect of the utterance at the expense of the other. The illocutionary dimension of the utterance tells us how we say things. The perlocutionary dimensions tells us why.
It makes sense to see How To Do Things With Words not as a philosophy of
language, nor as a contribution to linguistics, but as a part of Austin's attempt to come up with "a cautious, latter-day version of conduct" ("A Plea for Excuses," 177).
In other words, it is about human action and everyday ethics. How To Do Things
With Words asks us to look at our conduct in language. It analyzes in some detail what Austin calls in the essay on excuses "the machinery of the action." He induces us to break down the speech act into (logical) stages, which, for our convenience and perhaps to our confusion, he sees as separate "acts."
Austin insists on taxonomies because he considers the problem of "how we decide what is the correct name for 'the' action that somebody did" ("A Plea for Perhaps, as Austin suggests, the cat drove the pig over the stile. But the story is about the old lady's intentions and not the cat's success with the pig. So we might do better to say that the woman got the cat to drive the pig over the stile, or, if we want to take the longest view, we can reduce the story to its nub and can say that old lady (finally!) got the pig over the stile and got her old man's supper. This description, though accurate, would beggar the story. It would elide the cat and the dog, and the rat and the cow and everything else that makes it so much fun. All description comes at a cost. It depends on what you think is important.
How we might describe an action depends on how expansive we want to be in our views and what it is that we want to assess. If we emphasize the illocutionary force of a given speech act, then we will concentrate on the relatively short time that spans the utterance's articulation and its sequel. We will end our account when the utterance achieves uptake, takes effect and is greeted with a conventional response. If we emphasize an utterance's perlocutionary aim or its effect, then we will have to take a longer view of the total speech act. We will have to canvas the ways in which the speech act encompasses both its perlocutionary intention and its "consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts or actions of the audience" (101). Because our interest in the perlocutionary dimension of an utterance necessarily means that we cannot appeal to the explicit performative to name the act and locate its intention, we will need to engage in reconstruction-or depend on others' reconstructions-to tell us what kind of effect was aimed at. And we will need to depend on testimony-even our own reports-to gauge the extent to which that effect was achieved. More often than not, intention is secured retrospectively.
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It would seem then that our descriptions of speech acts will shift with our emphases, and that our assessments will hew to those emphases as well. Our judg-" . Felman reminds that psychoanalysis teaches us that the utterance is vulnerable to disruption 15 so that "the act cannot know what it is doing." I wonder if it cannot know it, or usually does not know it, at least beforehand. The intention that marks the illocutionary force of an utterance is often as opaque as the perlocutionary aim of an utterance, especially to the speaker. But that just means that the intentions we ascribe to any dimension of the speech act are always liable to reconstruction. Were they not, the course of psychoanalysis would truly be impossible, rather than merely unlikely. See Felman, 96. ments derive from the scope of our descriptions. This is not unimportant. What we look at and how we describe a speech act will determine how we assess it. To factcheck a political speech is not to judge what happens when that speech moves an audience, and Austin's account reminds us that the politician is responsible for more than just the nimbleness of her arguments or the accuracy of her facts. To put it pointedly: to assess the President's success in convincing the country to go to war is not the same as judging the acuteness of his reasons. The two are related, to be sure, but the President in this case is responsible for more than just being correct. He bears a responsibility-it is an open question just how far this responsibility should extendfor his perlocutionary aims. As Austin reminds us, appropriateness counts. The perlocutionary dimension reminds us to take this long view. It makes us ask about the reach of consequences. 16 Given all this, we can again see why Austin's followers expend so little effort on the perlocutionary. The perlocutionary is messier and less visibly conventional. It requires more tact. It also smacks of the "merely subjective." The illocutionary lookson the surface, at least-a lot more solid. It can be studied by paying attention to the distinctions that already inhere in language, distinctions that seem more objective and thus can be more readily schematized. The perlocutionary, which is harder to abstract and seems more or less inextricable from context, will inevitably turn on special circumstances. It extends farther in time and brings into play considerations that might at first seem extraneous to the illocutionary. In short: an emphasis on the perlocutionary makes the boundaries of the act all that much harder to determine.
There is also the matter of Austin's audience's interests. The insight of the early lectures in How To Do Things With Words-the relation of "meaning" to force-speaks to many of the preoccupations of modern philosophy in a way that the Austin's claim that our task is to analyze the utterance "in these circumstance, to this audience, for these purposes and with these intentions" does not. But as my handling of these issues undoubtedly shows, I am not by profession a philosopher. I was trained to read and write about literature and I come to Austin to help me think about the particular issues that concern someone who teaches novels and poems for a living. readers such as Maximilian de Gaynesford -has been made of Austin's telling obser 20 -vation that a performative utterance will "be in a peculiar way hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem" (22; emphasis added). De Gaynesford argues, correctly I think, that Austin is not saying all that much about poetry here. He is merely observing-and this is hardly a revolutionary insight on Austin's part-that performative utterances in poems do not take effect in the way that performative utterances might take effect in everyday life. Poetry exempts the poet from her commitments to some degree. The promise that the poet makes in a poem is not one that she is expected to keep. In literature, our performatives act "in a peculiar way ." 21 Given my emphasis on conventions above, I would like to recast de Gaynesfort's point in slightly different terms. Literature is highly conventional in almost every sense, from the complications of literary form to the specialized modes of readerly attention that those complications require. Competence in literary reading requires training beyond mere linguistic mastery, and competence in literary writing requires training beyond the shibboleths of grammar and usage. Our education in literature and its conventions teaches us to accept forms of thought and expression that we would consider suspect in other parts of our lives. In other words, literature is different because it works differently and its difference is why we call it "literature" in the first place. We distinguish it from other kinds of utterance for a reason.
In literature, the performative utterance becomes "peculiarly" hollow or void because the conventions of literature supervene and trump those of everyday use. On stage, the conventions of the performative that would, in ordinary, non-literary contexts govern the force of an utterance, do not obtain or else they obtain differently.
We know from our competence in literature that we are not obliged to rush out to obey an order even though Donne has delivered it. (And because we are competent readers of literature, we know that his command that we catch a falling star is impos- " . This is a different claim than Searle's assertion that fiction is made possible by "a set of 21 conventions which suspend the normal operation of the rules relating illocutionary acts to the world." Searle is perhaps too imprecise here. He is talking about the rules of reference and therefore locutionary 'meaning' (sense and reference) rather than illocutionary force. In the discussion that follows, I am claiming that one of the conventions of literature is that it suspends in 'a peculiar way' the conventions that govern locutionary reference and illocutionary force. See John Searle, "The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse," Expression and Meaning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 67. sible to begin with.) Something happens to the illocutionary force in literature and this "something" affects the sequel and the response that it solicits as well.
So far so good: none of this is particularly novel. Just as we know that "it is only a story," we know that it is "only a poem." This means that the " hollow" or "void" performatives that appear in a literary work more often than not do not serve their usual illocutionary ends. Orders are not meant to be taken as orders; promises do not take effect as promises. Instead, they are serving perlocutionary aims. Literature thus can be said to follow the loose perlocutionary formula ("By saying x, I was doing y"). 22 By ordering us to "Go and catch a falling star," Donne is trying to convince us that women are naturally (and therefore inevitably) inconstant. Put most crudely, illocuti- If I had more space, I would try all this out on an actual literary text, but there is only time for a peroration here, and a short one at that. So here goes: in this essay, I have asked if we want to rise to Austin's provocations. As I have really only concentrated on one of those provocations-the unacknowledged importance of the perlocutionary in his work-I will limit my final question to this. How seriously do we want to take the perlocutionary dimension of our utterances? If we do want to take it, and therefore Austin, seriously, then we must learn to measure meaning-all meaningon our pulses. 
